Acceptance criteria
Inventory local and remote MCP servers reached from desktop, IDE and CLI AI tools with owner, scope and exposure.
Why it matters
MCP-capable clients now ship inside IDEs, terminals and desktop apps, and each connector is a new path to corporate data.
How to verify
Local and remote MCP servers used by pilot users appear with client, owner, scope and exposure.
OWASP adoption context
Citizen-built, code-executing and MCP-extended workflows can attach external servers, so connector discovery must reach those integration paths.
Framework mappings
The MCP and connector inventory identifies third-party components and services, with owner, scope and exposure to inform supplier prioritization and component-risk mapping. Discovery alone does not assess their risks.
ISO/IEC 42001: The local and remote MCP/connector inventory documents resources relevant to AI activities, including their owner, scope and exposure, supporting A.4.2. External MCP servers and connectors also identify supplier relationships to govern under A.10.3; locally owned servers are not automatically suppliers. Inventory does not establish supplier due diligence or trustworthiness.
The inventory exposes external MCP servers and runtime-connected components relevant to agentic supply-chain compromise. It provides a review surface, not evidence that components are trustworthy.
Owned connector records supply usable inventory/control information and inputs to supplier-risk review. Keeping the register current does not itself approve a connector or reduce its permissions. ISO/IEC 27001: Maintain usable, owned inventory records. Internally owned servers are not automatically suppliers, and discovery does not assess supplier security.