{"id":"AGT-005","section":"Agent & MCP Governance","requirement":"Provide targeted containment for a single connector or tool.","acceptance":"Disable or revoke one connector, tool, plugin, or integration for a user or group without switching off the whole AI tool.","tier":"AT1, AT2, AT3, AT6","whyItMatters":"When one connector misbehaves, switching off the whole AI tool punishes everyone.","verificationMethod":"LT","verificationTest":"One connector is disabled for one pilot group while the AI tool keeps working.","formerly":null,"alsoIn":["aidr"],"sort":40,"adoptionContext":"The listed agent contexts may share an AI client across multiple connectors, making targeted revocation preferable to disabling the whole tool when feasible.","mappings":[{"frameworks":["csf","soc2","iso27001"],"explanation":"Disabling an affected connector or revoking its token removes a specific access path and supplies an incident-containment action. It contributes to eradication only where it removes the compromised access mechanism; containment alone does not establish complete eradication or incident response.\nISO/IEC 27001: A.5.26: Integrate containment into the buyer’s incident process. A.5.18: Review effective access and adjust or revoke it where required; cached access and in-flight actions may survive revocation.","kind":"framework","references":{"csf":["RS.MI-01","RS.MI-02"],"soc2":["CC6.3","CC7.4"],"iso27001":["A.5.26","A.5.18"]},"relation":null,"conditions":[]},{"frameworks":["rmf","iso"],"explanation":"A targeted disablement mechanism enables disengagement of an unsafe AI dependency while other functions remain available. It contributes to operational response, but the capability alone does not establish who has authority to invoke it or a complete operational-support process.","kind":"framework","references":{"rmf":["MANAGE 2.4"],"iso":["A.6.2.6"]},"relation":null,"conditions":[]},{"frameworks":["owasp"],"explanation":"Isolating a connector, tool or token can interrupt propagation through an agent workflow, matching the isolation and circuit-breaker approach to cascading failures. The scope and timing of disablement determine which downstream actions it can contain.","kind":"framework","references":{"owasp":["ASI08"]},"relation":null,"conditions":[]}],"area":"Agent & MCP Governance","areaSlug":"AGT","url":"/r/AGT-005","frameworkRefs":{"ISO27001":["A.5.26","A.5.18"],"ISO42001":["A.6.2.6"],"NIST-CSF":["RS.MI-01","RS.MI-02"],"NIST-AI-RMF":["MANAGE 2.4"],"SOC2":["CC6.3","CC7.4"],"OWASP-ASI":["ASI08"]}}